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 Papps: ROLE AND DETERMINANTS OF BRIDE-PRICE part of it, is retained at the time of a divorce, this does not
 become the wife's property, but remains with her male kin.
 Can there here be a confusion between bridewealth and dowry?
 British anthropologists make a clear distinction, though Papps
 says nobody does. The fathers of educated girls do indeed ask
 a higher bridewealth, but not because education makes them
 better farm workers. These girls marry salary earners in the
 towns and expect to "live like ladies."
 by FREDERIC L. PRYOR
 Department of Economics, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa.
 19081, U.S.A. 26 ix 82
 The notion that certain aspects of marriage arrangements can
 be explored in a fruitful manner with the tools of economic
 analysis is not a novel insight; several empirical studies (un-
 fortunately not cited by the author) have isolated important
 supply-and-demand factors underlying the bride-price. I do
 not believe that Papps's study has added much to this literature.
 As the author notes, the model does not tell us whether the
 bride-price is positively or negatively related to fertility until
 we know something about (a) relative elasticities of the supply
 and demand curves and (b) shifts of these curves occasioned by
 the promise of fertility: (a) The nature of marriage in many
 precapitalist societies suggests that the supply curve is often
 almost vertical. The author's assertion (without empirical
 evidence) that the supply curve is more elastic than the demand
 curve is based on a theoretical consideration that is only one of
 many factors underlying such elasticities. (b) We are given no
 empirical evidence to tell us whether it is reasonable to assume
 that children are a public good such that the utility from them
 is the same for the husband and wife. Since the maternal
 mortality in such societies is so high, the woman risks her life
 with the birth of each child; thus her discounted utility of
 enjoyment of children might be much less than that of her
 husband. In such a case the supply curve shift accompanying
 greater fertility might be less than the demand curve shift, so
 that the correlation between potential fertility and the bride-
 price might be positive, not negative.
 The other propositions (that "nice" husbands pay less, that
 virgins fetch a higher bride-price than widows, and that intra-
 clan marriages result in lower bride-prices than extraclan
 marriages) are trivial applications of supply-and-demand
 analysis that require no fancy diagrams or math to prove.
 Since the author tells us nothing about the correlations
 between the fertility variable and other variables that could
 influence the bride-price, we do not know if the reported corre-
 lations could have any causal significance. The lack of tests
 against alternative models of the bride-price also reduces our
 confidence in the results. One unexplained technical puzzle
 raises further doubts: since ordinary least-square methods are
 calculated to achieve the "best fit," it is unclear why we find
 much higher coefficients of determination for the two equations
 where the regression line is forced through the origin.
 by STEPHEN P. REYNA and NANCY E. GRATTON
 Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Horton Social
 Science Center, University of New Hampshire, Durham, N.H
 03824, U.S.A. 2 x 82
 Papps, following Becker (1981), applies neoclassical economics
 to the understanding of the family. She extends the tradition's
 scope by analyzing bride-price, arguing that it is "the dis-
 counted value of part or all of the wife's share of marital
 output" and as such is controlled by market forces. She claims
 that an ordinary least-squares regression analysis performed
 on a sample of bride-prices collected by Granqvist (1931)
 supports her position. We offer the following observations:
 1. Granqvist's data come from a region in which the market
 as a price-fixing institution has existed for a long time. How-
 ever, most societies in which bride-price was or is paid lack
 such markets. Papps's evidence, thus, probably comes from an
 atypical case.
 2. The regression analysis is based upon extremely small
 samples (16 and 17 cases) and employs complex equations.
 (One, for example, uses six variables.) In such samples there is
 considerable probability that random values of one or two
 variables will "control" the model. Therefore it is not sur-
 prising that many of the variables do not have significant
 results. Further, those which do may be explained by recourse
 to entirely different models than Papps's. For example, the
 consistently significant positive results for the relationship
 between bride-price and husband and wife kinship may be as
 well explained by customary preferences as by market forces.
 Papps terms her regression analysis results "encouraging." We
 concur, if it is understood by this that the results neither
 strongly support nor challenge her position.
 3. People paying bride-price conceive of and measure value
 in very different ways than in the West. Yet Papps announces
 that BPi = P,- C, where BP, is brideprice, Ci is the value
 of the bride's consumption of marriage output including public
 and private goods, and Pi is the total present value of public
 and private goods accruing to the bride over time. Private
 goods are such things as food and clothing, and public goods
 seem, in the main, to be the children produced by the marriage.
 The equation, if it is to make mathematical sense, requires
 that a common coin of valuation exist for the very disparate
 public and private goods. Yet in most societies with bride-price
 there is no general-purpose money by which a valid common
 valuation could be established. How, then, is the analyst to
 compute the value of a private good, food, and add it to a
 public one, a child, when measuring Ci and P,? Papps does not
 seem aware that such validity problems exist. They are, how-
 ever, very real: equations based upon measurements of different
 economic values, where value is not validly measured, are
 absurd.
 4. Observations 1, 2, and 3 suggest that there is weak
 support for Papps's position and, further, that there is little
 guidance as to how to perform those analyses which might
 validly provide support.
 5. Many anthropologists believe that bride-prices in market-
 less societies are simply not prices. Radcliffe-Brown (1971:124),
 for example, characterized such payments as "prestations," by
 which he meant money or service "due by law or custom."
 Goody and Tambiah (1973) pointedly speak only of bride-
 wealth and never bride-price. Meillassoux (1981:64) says that
 bridewealth goods have "conventional" value. The crux of the
 issue is that many anthropologists believe that custom, law, or
 political action set marriage payments at levels other than
 those which would be imposed by market forces. However,
 studies conforming to the norms of contemporary empirical
 data analysis that support this position are lacking.
 6. Many anthropologists have insisted that a major function
 of bride-price is to create and reproduce alliances between
 groups (Radcliffe-Brown 1971:129; Meillassoux 1981:61).
 Alliances do not produce outputs which over time acquire
 discounted values, though they may foster production activities
 which have such consequences. Consequently, there is little
 likelihood that the value of alliance equals the discounted
 value of the wife's share of the marriage output.
 7. The preceding suggests an alternative view: that in
 marketless societies bride-price, like the bride, arbitrarily
 symbolizes alliance and resembles gift exchange between heads
 of state. The United States gives China a chair embossed with
 an eagle, the Chinese reciprocate with a panda; a Toupouri in
 Chad gives 11 cattle and conventionally receives a wife. Chair,
 panda, cattle, and wife are arbitrary symbols of relationship.
 8. Many prices observed in the contemporary world are not
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